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Many  papers  have  been  documenting  and  analysing  the  asymmetry  and  the  weakening  of  the  oil  price  – 
macroeconomy relationship as off the early eighties. While there seems to be a consensus about the factors 
causing the asymmetry, namely adjustment costs which offset the benefits of low energy prices, the debate about 
the weakening of the relationship is not over yet. Moreover, the alternative oil price specifications which have 
been proposed by Mork (1989), Lee et al. (1995), and Hamilton (1996) to restore the stability of the relationship 
fail to Granger cause output or unemployment in post-1980 data. By using the concept of accelerations of the oil 
price, we show that the weakening of this relationship corresponds to the appearance of slow oil price increases, 
which have less impact on the economy. When filtering out these slow oil price variations from the sample, we 
manage to rehabilitate the causality running from the oil price to the macroeconomy and show that far from 
weakening,  the  oil  price  accelerations  –  GDP  relationship  has  even  been  growing  stronger  since  the  early 
eighties. 
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1. Introduction 
Ever  since  Hamilton  (1983)  reported  the  existence  of  a  statistical  relationship  between  oil  price 
variations and GDP, many were the authors (Mork (1989), Lee et al. (1995), Hooker (1996), Hamilton 
(1996), Hooker (2000)) who showed that this relationship was suffering from breakpoints, and worse, 
that  it  was  globally  weakening  after  1980.  Efforts  were  therefore  devoted  to  restore  a  stable 
relationship between the oil price and the economic activity. The most notable attempts were aimed at 
transforming the oil price variable, by ways of filters and other non linear transformations, so that the 
alternative models would be able to restore causality running from the oil price to GDP. Mork (1989), 
Lee, Ni and Ratti (1995) and Hamilton (1996), offered alternative oil price specifications, which are 
able  to  restore a  globally stable relationship  between  their  variables  and  GDP.  However,  Hooker 
(2000) showed that none of these asymmetric and nonlinear transformations of the oil price were 
satisfying as they were not able to Granger cause output or unemployment in post-1980 data. 
 
In this paper, we offer a simple and intuitive alternative to these specifications, by separating oil price 
increases into two components, simple increases and accelerating increases. While the simple increase 
corresponds to Mork (1989)’s oil price increase, the accelerating increase is an original specification, 
easily interpretable, and with excellent fitting properties. Without having to switch from quarterly to 
annual data as Hooker (2000) did to regain significance, this new specification enables us to show that 
while other oil price specifications do not Granger cause US GDP after 1980, oil price accelerations 
do. Our findings lead to the conclusion that the non accelerating oil price variations (the slow oil 
shocks probably caused by demand shocks rather than by oil production disruptions), that appeared 
after the early eighties are causing the weakening of the oil price – macroeconomy relationship. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is reviewing the arguments explaining the asymmetry and 
weakening of this relationship. Section 3 presents and compares the perfomances of some of the oil 
price  specifications  aiming  at  restoring  the  stability  of  the  relationship,  by  carrying  out recursive 
causality tests in a VAR model inspired by Hamilton (1983) and Mork (1989). Section 4 presents our   3 
proposed specification, based on the concept of oil price accelerations, and shows how it out-performs 
the other specifications in Granger causing US GDP. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. An asymmetric and weakening oil price – GDP relationship 
Ever since the first oil shocks in the seventies, the oil price – macroeconomy relationship has become 
a major center of interest for economists. Many transmission routes have been identified to explain 
how oil price increases work their way  up to affect economic activity, and may be found in the 
exhaustive reviews of the large literature on the subject made by Jones and Leiby (1996), Jones et al. 
(2001) and Brown and Yücel (2002).  
Yet, no sooner had Hamilton (1983) established that oil price variations Granger caused US GDP 
variations, that Mork (1989) showed that this did not hold after the 1986 collapse of the oil price. 
Indeed, it became obvious that while oil price increases induced recessions, oil price decreases did not 
stimulate economic activity in a symmetric manner. To account for this asymmetry, Hamilton (1988) 
suggested that some attention be given to adjustment costs. Indeed, these costs appear whether the oil 
price  goes  up  or  goes  down.  When  the  oil  price  goes  up,  the  adjustment  costs  merely  represent 
additional costs to the direct oil shock impact, but when it goes down, they may offset the benefits of 
low energy prices. A review of these adjustment costs can be found in Jones et al. (2002) and Brown 
and  Yücel  (2002).  They  include  costs  related  to  sectoral  shifts,  changes  in  the  capital  stock, 
coordination problems between firms and finally costs related to the uncertainty of future oil prices. 
The sectoral shifts costs were initially identified by Lilien (1982), who established that inter-sectoral 
reallocations  of  labour  following  exogenous  shocks  were  a  major  cause  of  increases  of  the 
unemployment  rate.  Oil  price  increases  or  decreases  cause  labor  reallocations  between  energy 
intensive  sectors  and  energy  efficient  ones,  which  in  the  short  term  lead  to  unemployment  and 
underutilisation of resources. Using Lilien’s findings in an empirical study, Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1999) identified two transmission mechanisms through which oil price variations affect economic 
activity and which provide an explanation for the asymmetry. The first one is the aggregate channel, 
which works through potential output, income transfer and sticky wages effects, as well as imperfect 
competition effects (evidenced by Rotemberg & Woodford (1996)). The second one is the allocative   4 
channel, which reflects the mismatch between a firm’s desired and actual levels of labor and capital. 
The authors observe that oil price increases have a negative impact on unemployment through both 
channels, while oil price decreases have a negative impact on the allocative channel, which cancels out 
the positive impact on unemployment obtained through the aggregate one. 
To  explain  the  costs  induced  by  changes  in  the  capital  stock  following  energy  price  variations, 
Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) use KLEM production functions (relating output to capital, labor, energy 
and non energy material). The authors assume that technology is following a putty-clay model, which 
allows for ex-ante substitutions of factors but not ex-post ones, which means that industries can take 
into  account  the  trends  of  energy  and  of  other  factors  to  make  their  investment,  but  once  the 
technology  is  adopted,  there  is  no  turning  back.  In  the  short  term,  a  variation  of  energy  which 
necessitates a change in the capital stock therefore induces a costly reorganisation. 
Due to their experience of prior oil price shocks, it is also safe to assume that firms know what their 
reaction will be to oil price variations. However, they do not know how other firms, especially in 
different sectors, will react to these shocks, which may induce economic disruptions due to wrong 
expectations and inadequate coordination, as explained in Huntington (2000). 
Finally, Federer (1996) and Lee et al. (1995) have showed that both oil price variations and oil price 
volatility have a negative impact on output growth, through the postponing of irreversible investment. 
 
In addition to the asymmetry induced by the above mentioned adjustment costs, it was also noticed by 
some authors (Hooker (2000), Loungany and Yücel (2000)) that the oil price – economic activity 
relationship  was  weakening.  Main  factors  to  explain  this  weakening  are  the  changes  that  have 
transformed the US monetary policy and its response to oil price shocks in the early eighties, the 
decline  of the  energy  consumption  to  GDP  ratio,  the  growing  endogeneity  of  energy  prices  with 
regards  to  the  economic  activity  which  makes  oil  price  increases  less  disruptive,  the  gains  in 
productivity which may enable firms to suffer less from high energy prices and finally, the so-called 
“experience effect” which leads to better policy responses, better coverage against high energy prices 
and lower adjustment costs, based on prior experience of oil price shocks. Blanchard and Gali (2007) 
have also identified the decrease in real wage rigidities to account for the weakening of the oil price –   5 
GDP relationship. In a rigid labour market in which real wages adjust slowly, an adverse supply shock 
will  induce  an  increase  of  inflation  and  a  decrease  of  output.  The  increased  flexibility  that  has 
characterized the US labour market ever since the early eighties may therefore account for the mild 
influence of oil price variations on GDP. 
 
Given the asymmetry and the weakening of the oil price – macroeconomy relationship, many efforts 
were then devoted to restore its stability. Below are presented some of these attempts, followed by our 
own proposition. 
 
3. Attempts to restore a stable GDP – macroeconomy relationship 
3.1 Data and Methodology 
In his 1983 article, Hamilton used a multivariate reduced-form VAR approximation to macroeconomic 
reality inspired by Sims (1980). To represent the oil price variable, Hamilton used the log change of 
the  Producer  Price  Index  for  crude  oil.  Since  this  index  does  not  take  into  account  international 
movements of the oil price prior to 1974 (due to oil price controls in the US in the 1970s), we decided 
to follow Mork (1989) by using the composite refiner acquisition cost (RAC), a weighted average of 
domestic and imported crude oil costs, including transportation and other fees paid by the refiners in 
the US. This index is available from the US Energy Information Agency at a quarterly rate from 
1974Q2 until today, and at an annual rate from 1968 until today. It is therefore necessary to extend it 
so that our sample spans the whole 1948-2009 period at a quarterly rate. To do so, we constructed the 
following oil price variable: 
 
-  For 1974Q2 until today, we use the log change of the refiner acquisition cost for crude oil 
(source: US Energy Information Agency). 
-  For 1971Q3 to 1974Q1, we use the log change of the PPI for crude oil (source: US Bureau of 
Labour Statistics), which annual variations are corrected to correspond to the RAC’s annual 
variations (source: US Energy Information Agency).   6 
-  For 1948Q1 to 1971Q2, we use the log change of the PPI for crude oil (source: US Bureau of 
Labour Statistics). 
 
The sample Hamilton (1983) used to estimate his model, 1949Q2-1972Q4, did not include major oil 
price decreases, as Mork (1989) noted, and thus was not likely to hold after the large drop of the oil 
price in 1986. To investigate the validity of this assumption, we estimate Hamilton’s VAR model and 
apply recursive exclusion tests, which are explained below, for all oil price coefficients in the GDP 
equation. This model includes four lags and the following variables: the log change in the real GDP, 
the log change of the GDP implicit price deflator, the log change of the average hourly earnings in the 
manufacturing  sector,  the  log  change  of  the  oil  price  specification,  the  level  of  the  US  civilian 
unemployment rate and the level of the three months Treasury bill rate (the secondary market one). 
The data is provided by the Federal reserve Bank of St Louis, taken at a quarterly rate (a simple 
average is performed for the monthly data), and spans the period starting in the 1st quarter of 1948 and 
ending in the 2
nd quarter of 2009, which offers 246 observations.  
To determine the order of integration of these variables, augmented Dickey Fuller tests were carried 
out. GDP, the oil price and the treasury bill rate were found to be integrated of the 1
st order. The 
unemployment rate was found to be stationary. However, earnings and inflation were found to be 
integrated of the 2
nd order. The first difference of these two variables were used nevertheless, in order 
to be able to compare the results with Mork’s and Hamilton’s who had used the first difference as 
well
1. The recursive exclusion test consists in estimating the Fisher statistics for the joint significance 
of oil price coefficients in the GDP equation, in sub-samples in which we add one observation at each 
iteration. The first sample’s size must be strictly superior to the number of parameters (25 including 
the constant), and the last sample’s size corresponds to the whole sample. As in Andrews (1993), it is 
likely that the Fisher statistics at the beginning of the sample is degenerate. A trimming of 13% of the 
observations was therefore carried out at the beginning of the sample. These recursive exclusion tests 
                                                 
1  The  same  regressions  with  the  second  differences  of  earnings  and  inflation  do  not  produce  significantly 
different results. All results are available upon request to the author.   7 
help us understand how the oil price – GDP relationship has been evolving along time, and at which 
dates breakpoints may have occurred. 
 
3.2 Recursive causality tests 
Figure 1 reports the value of the F statistics for recursive exclusion tests for all oil price coefficients in 
the GDP equation of the 4 lags VAR model used by Hamilton. Apart from a short episode in 1975-
1976 during which the 4 oil price lags were only significant at the 5% statistical level (and not at 1%), 
we observe that the relationship is mostly significant on the first part of the sample, between the early 
1950s until the early 1980s. It then starts to weaken around 1982Q2 when a first breakpoint occurs, 
and sees the oil price variable’s significance fall below the 1% curve. This breakpoint is then followed 
by a second sharp breakpoint in 1986Q2 when the curve drops below the 5% significance level. Ever 
since this period, we note that the simple oil price variations never became significant again in the 
model. A reason which might explain this breakpoint has been put forward by Hooker (2000) who 
suggested that it may be caused by systematic changes in the US monetary policy from the end of the 
1970s on. With regards to the second breakpoint, it simply coincides with the 1986 negative oil shock, 
and had been evidenced by Mork (1989). 
 
FIGURE  1  Recursive  exclusion  tests  for  dlOilp  coefficients  in  the  dlGDP  equation  of  the  VAR,  where 
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In order to restore a significant relationship, Mork (1989) offered to separate the oil price variable into 
two components, oil price increases and oil price decreases. His positive specification was defined as 
follows:  t t dlOilp dlOilp 
 1   if  0  t dlOilp ,  else  0.  In  the  rest  of  the  paper,  we  will  refer  to  this 
specification as dlOilp1, as the negative counterpart of Mork’s specification is not significant in any of 
our estimations. As can be seen on Figure 2, the use of dlOilp1 somehow enables to rehabilitate the oil 
price – GDP relationship. 
 
FIGURE  2  Recursive  exclusion  tests  for  dlOilp1  coefficients  in  the  dlGDP  equation  of  the  VAR.  Sample 
beginning in 1956Q2. 
 
While Mork’s specification loses in significance in the first half of the sample compared with dlOilp, 
we note that it clearly gains in significance in the second half. It does not provide a very significant 
relationship with the real GDP as the curve rarely reaches above the 1% confidence curve, but it does 
provide a more stable one as the F curve is above the 5% confidence curve on most of the sample. 
 
Following Mork, Hamilton (1996) offered a new specification, the Net Oil Price Increase (NOPI), 
defined as the percentage of increase of the oil price compared with its values at the 4 previous 
quarters (resp. 36 quarters for another version), and zero if there is no increase. We will refer to this 
measure as NOPI 12 when the number of quarters used for the comparison is 12, and as NOPI 36 
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correspond to corrections of former oil price decreases, and hence to capture a “surprise effect”. Figure 







FIGURE  3  (a)  Recursive  exclusion  tests  for  NOPI12  coefficients  in  the  dlGDP  equation  of  the  VAR.  (b) 
Recursive exclusion tests for NOPI36 coefficients in the dlGDP equation of the VAR. Sample beginning in 
1956Q2 for (a) and in 1958Q2 for (b). 
 
While the NOPI 12 does not seem to improve significantly the performance of dlOilp1 as can be seen 
on figure 3 (a), their F curves being almost identical, we note on figure 3 (b) that the NOPI 36 does 
provide an excellent fit for the first half of the sample, with values well above the 1% confidence 
curve. However, after 1975, the curve drops abruptly and stays below the 1% confidence curve until 
2002. As was already noted by Hooker (2000), Hamilton’s specification seems to derive much of its 
apparent success to an improved fit in the pre-1970s data. 
 
Overall, these specifications offer a more stable relationship between the oil price and GDP, as they all 
manage to regain some significance in the second half of the sample. But they do not manage to reach  
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they probably do not properly reflect what has been happening to this relationship ever since the early 
1980s. 
 
4. Slow and accelerating oil price increases 
4.1 Methodology 
Following Huntington (2005, 2007) who stresses the distinction between sudden and gradual oil price 
increments,  we  offer  a  simple  and  intuitive  alternative  to  the  above  mentioned  specifications,  by 
separating oil price increases into two components, simple increases and accelerating increases. The 
classical way in economics to deal with a non stationary variable is to take its first difference (or its 
log  first  difference)  in  order  to  eliminate  the  secular  time  trend.  Which  is  why  in  most  papers 
dedicated to the oil price – macroeconomy relationship, the common approach is to consider the first 
difference of the oil price. This basically means that these studies choose to focus on the speed of the 
oil  price  (the ratio of the  first  difference  of a  variable  on  a  time  unit).  However,  in  many  other 
academic disciplines, physics and mechanics for instance, the sole speed does not suffice to explain 
all,  and  higher  differencing  is  often  needed.  The  second  derivative,  i.e.  the  acceleration,  is  a 
fundamental  variable  in  mechanics.  The  third  derivative,  called  “jerk”
2,  which  corresponds  to  a 
variation of the acceleration, can also be used in many applications (to measure a train’s comfort for 
example). Based on these concepts, we decide to consider a new specification, which we call an 
accelerating increase. It should be noted that our variable is not an acceleration per se, since we do not 
want to over-differentiate the series. We keep the first difference of the oil price, but we filter out oil 
price variations whose accelerations are not positive: 
t t dlOilp dlOilp  2  if  0  t dlOilp  and if  0 1    t t dlOilp dlOilp  else 0. 
                                                 
2 The tests performed with oil price accelerations were also performed with oil price jerks, and did not come up 
with  significantly  different  results  regarding  the  impact  on  GDP.  However,  at  the  sectoral  level,  when 
considering the impact on sectoral output, we did find that some sectors were much more responsive to oil price 
jerks than to oil price accelerations. This observation is to be further developed in a coming paper. 
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Carrying out the same recursive exclusion tests as above on this new specification provides the graph 




FIGURE 4 (a) Recursive exclusion tests for dlOilp2 coefficients in the dlGDP equation of the VAR. Sample 
beginning in 1956Q2. 
 
While dlOilp2 offers a poor fit for the first half of the sample, it exhibits excellent F statistics for the 
second half of the sample. After 1980, its F value is always above the 1% confidence curve, and 
clearly  outperforms  the  previously  shown  specifications.  Far  from  weakening,  the  oil  price 
acceleration – macroeconomy relationship seems to grow even stronger after 1980.  
 
4.2 Interpretation 
There is a very simple explanation to this phenomenon, which can be found on figure 5, representing 
the difference between dlOilp1 and dlOilp2. On the figure are represented all the oil price variations 
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FIGURE 5 Representation of dlOilp1-dlOilp2. 
 
Prior to 1975, we note that all oil price variations were also accelerating ones, since the difference is 
almost always null. Then during the first and the second oil shocks, slow oil price variations events 
started to appear, represented by the two remaining peaks around 1974 and 1980. After the second half 
of the eighties, slow oil price variations become much more common, including the periods around the 
first Gulf war and the 2000’s oil price increases. These slow oil price increases, which can be more 
easily anticipated by economic actors, are likely to have less impact on the economy than accelerating 
oil  price  variations,  which  carry  a  much  larger  surprise  effect.  When  using  other  oil  price 
specifications, which do not separate slow and accelerating oil price variations, previous papers were 
carrying their econometric estimations with both kinds of shocks combined, therefore averaging the 
impact  on  the  economy  and  concluding  with  a  weakening  of  the  oil  price  –  macroeconomy 
relationship. But it is the apparition of slow oil price variations, which do less harm to the economy, 
that seems to be the cause of this weakening. 
Two questions therefore arise: why did these slow oil shocks start to appear as off the early eighties? 
And why would they cause less harm to the economy? 
An answer to the first question may be found in Kilian (2006), which is addressing the nature of oil 
price shocks. Using an SVAR, the author decomposes the real oil price into four components: oil 
supply shocks driven by political events in OPEC countries, other oil supply shocks, aggregate shocks 
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Thanks to this orthogonal decomposition of shocks affecting the oil market, Kilian manages to show 
that shocks to the world aggregate demand and fears about future supplies of oil have much more 
influence on oil price variations than shocks to the crude oil production do. Do the slow oil price 
shocks identified in figure 5 correspond to Kilian’s aggregate demand and oil market specific demand 
shocks? It seems at least consistent with the intuitive idea that oil price variations should be driven 
more slowly by progressive demand shocks than by brutal oil production disruptions, and makes it 
plausible to conclude that the appearance of the slow oil price shocks may have been caused by the 
growing importance of oil consuming emerging countries like China and India ever since the early 
eighties.  However,  it  would  require  another  study  to  prove  this  theory,  along  with  another 
methodology  that  would  enable  to  separate  exogenous  and  endogenous  components  of  oil  price 
variations, as was suggested in Barsky and Kilian (2002) and implemented in Kilian (2005, 2006). 
As to why these non accelerating oil price increases do less harm to the economy than oil price 
accelerations, Huntington (2005) showed how sudden oil price increases scare households and firms, 
and  induce  brutal  adjustments  with  regards  to  investment,  production,  consumption  and  to  the 
negotiations  of  wages  and  prices.  These  brutal  adjustments  can  temporarily  leave  plants  and 
equipments  idle,  and  hence  workers  unemployed.  While  non  accelerating  oil  price  increases,  by 
allowing  more  progressive  adjustments,  enable  firms  and  households  to  adopt  more  efficient 
strategies. This issue of adjustment was also addressed by Blanchard and Gali (2007), who showed 
how the increased flexibility of the labour market may have also played a crucial role in explaining the 
milder impact of oil price shocks on inflation and output. Combined together, these two arguments 
support the theory  according  to  which  slow  oil  price  shocks  may  have  favoured  progressive  and 
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6. Conclusion 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  investigate  the  oil  price  –  macroeconomy  relationship  using  a  new 
specification for the oil price variable, based on the concept of acceleration. Using a VAR model 
inspired by Hamilton (1983) and Mork (1989) and carrying out recursive exclusion tests, we are able 
to show that the so-called “weakening of the oil price – macroeconomy relationship” observed by 
many authors seems to be due to the appearance of slow oil price shocks as off the seventies and 
eighties. These slow oil price shocks, by allowing firms and households to adjust more progressively, 
have less impact on the economy. Factors causing the appearance of these slow oil price shocks 
remain to be identified, but are more likely to be found in the increasing importance played by demand 
shocks rather than oil supply disruptions. By filtering out these slow oil price increases from the 
sample, and by focusing only on accelerating oil price increases, we show that far from weakening, the 
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